# Byzantine Robustness and Partial Participation Can Be Achieved Simultaneously:

Just Clip Gradient Differences

Grigory Malinovsky  $^1$  Peter Richtárik  $^1$  Samuel Horváth  $^2$  Eduard Gorbunov  $^2$ 

 $^1$ King Abdullah University of Science and Technology  $^2$ Mohamed bin Zayed University of Artificial Intelligence



# 1. Byzantine-Robust Optimization

#### Distributed optimization problem:

$$\min_{x \in \mathbb{R}^d} \left\{ f(x) = \frac{1}{\mathcal{G}} \sum_{i \in \mathcal{G}} f_i(x) \right\}, \quad f_i(x) = \frac{1}{m} \sum_{j=1}^m f_{i,j}(x) \quad \forall i \in \mathcal{G}$$

 $\bullet$   $\mathcal{G}$  is the set of regular clients


جامعة الملك عبدالله

King Abdullah University of

Science and Technology

للعلوم والتقنية

- $\mathcal{B}$  is the set of  $Byzantine\ workers$  the workers that can arbitrarily deviate from the prescribed protocol (maliciously or not) and are assumed to be omniscient
- $\mathcal{G} \sqcup \mathcal{B} = [n]$  is the set of clients participating in training



#### Main difficulties in Byzantine-robust optimization:

- When functions are arbitrarily heterogeneous, the problem is impossible to solve
- Fraction of Byzantines  $\delta = B/n$  should be smaller than 1/2
- Standard approaches based on averaging are vulnerable
- Robust aggregation alone does not ensure robustness [1]
- Non-triviality of partial participation: all existing approaches are vulnerable to the situations when regular workers do not form a majority during some rounds

# 2. Robust Aggregation

#### Popular aggregation rules:

- $\operatorname{Krum}(x_1, \dots, x_n) := \operatorname{argmin}_{x_i \in \{x_1, \dots, x_n\}} \sum_{j \in S_i} ||x_j x_i||^2$  [7], where  $S_i \subseteq \{x_1, \dots, x_n\}$  are  $n - |\mathcal{B}| - 2$  closest vectors to  $x_i$
- Robust Fed. Averaging:  $RFA(x_1, ..., x_n) := \operatorname{argmin}_{x \in \mathbb{R}^d} \sum_{i=1}^n \|x x_i\|$
- Coordinate-wise Median:  $[CM(x_1, ..., x_n)]_t := \operatorname{argmin}_{u \in \mathbb{R}} \sum_{i=1}^n |u [x_i]_t|$ These defenses are vulnerable to Byzantine attacks [8,9] and do not satisfy the following definition.

#### Definition 1: $(\delta, c)$ -Robust Aggregator (modification of the definition from [1]

The quantity 
$$\widehat{x}$$
 is  $(\delta, c)$ -Robust Aggregator  $((\delta, c)$ -RAgg) if 
$$\mathbb{E}\left[\|\widehat{x} - \overline{x}\|^2\right] \leq c\delta\sigma^2, \text{ where}$$
 (1)

• Input:  $\{x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n\}$ 

- There exists a subset  $\mathcal{G} \subseteq [n]$  of size  $|\mathcal{G}| = G \ge (1 \delta)n$  for  $\delta < 0.5 \text{ such that } \frac{1}{G(G-1)} \sum_{i,l \in \mathcal{G}} \mathbb{E}[\|x_i - x_l\|^2] \le \sigma^2$
- $\bullet \ \overline{x} = \frac{1}{|\mathcal{G}|} \sum_{i \in \mathcal{G}} x_i$
- $\hat{x}$  is agnostic  $((\delta, c)$ -ARAgg), if it can be computed without knowledge of  $\sigma$

One can robustify Krum, RFA, and CM using bucketing [1].

### Algorithm Bucketing: Robust Aggregation using bucketing [1]

- 1: Input:  $\{x_1,\ldots,x_n\}$ ,  $s\in\mathbb{N}$  bucket size, Aggr aggregator
- 2: Sample random permutation  $\pi = (\pi(1), \dots, \pi(n))$  of [n]
- 3: Compute  $y_i=rac{1}{s}\sum_{k=s(i-1)+1}^{\min\{si,n\}}x_{\pi(k)}$  for  $i=1,\ldots,\lceil n/s
  ceil$
- 4: **Return:**  $\widehat{x} = \operatorname{Aggr}(y_1, \dots, y_{\lceil n/s \rceil})$

#### Main Contributions

- ♦ New method: Byz-VR-MARINA-PP. We develop Byzantine-tolerant Variance-Reduced MARINA with Partial Participation (Byz-VR-MARINA-PP) – the first distributed method having Byzantine robustness and allowing partial participation of clients.
- ♦ New convergence rates. We derive convergence guarantees for the proposed method under mild assumptions.
- ♦ New application of gradient clipping. The key tool that allows our method to withstand Byzantines attacks even when all sampled clients are Byzantine is clipping.

# 3. Ingredient 1: Variance Reduction

SGD: 
$$x^{k+1} = x^k - \gamma g^k$$
,  $g^k = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \nabla f_{i,j_i^k}(x^k)$ 

- lacktriangleright Variances of the estimators  $\nabla f_{i,j_i^k}(x^k)$  do not go to zero
- > Byzantines can easily hide in the noise and create a large bias (even if the aggregation is robust)

$$\begin{array}{ll} \underline{\mathsf{SAGA}}\ [2]:\ x^{k+1} = x^k - \gamma g^k, \quad g^k = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n g_i^k, \\ g_i^k = \nabla f_{j_i^k}(x^k) - \nabla f_{i,j_i^k}(w_{i,j_i^k}^k) + \frac{1}{m} \sum_{j=1}^m \nabla f_{i,j}(w_{i,j}^k) \end{array}$$

- $\checkmark$  Variances of the estimators  $g_i^k$  go to zero
- $m{\times}$  Analysis relies on the unbiasedness:  $\mathbb{E}[g_i^k \mid x^k] = \nabla f_i(x^k)$


#### SARAH/Geom-SARAH/PAGE [3,4,5]:

$$\overline{x^{k+1}} = x^k - \gamma g^k, \quad g^k = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n g_i^k,$$

$$g_i^k = \begin{cases} \nabla f_i(x^k), & \text{with prob. } p, \\ g_i^{k-1} + \nabla f_{i,j_i^k}(x^k) - \nabla f_{i,j_i^k}(x^{k-1}), & \text{with prob. } 1 - p \end{cases}$$

- $\checkmark$  Variances of the estimators  $g_i^k$  go to zero
- $\checkmark$  Analysis does not rely on the unbiasedness:  $\mathbb{E}[g_i^k \mid x^k] \neq \nabla f_i(x^k)$

How can variance reduction help? It leaves less space for Byzantines to hide in the noise.



# 4. Ingredient 2: Clipping

#### Clipping operator:

$$\operatorname{elip}(x,\lambda) = \begin{cases} \min\left\{1, \frac{\lambda}{\|x\|}\right\} x, & \text{if } x \neq 0, \\ 0, & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$
 (2)

#### Properties of clipping:

- Boundedness:  $\|\operatorname{clip}(x,\lambda)\| \leq \lambda$
- ✓ If the direction is spoiled, clipping ensures that the algorithm does not go far away even when Byzantines form majority
- Controlled bias:  $\|\operatorname{clip}(x,\lambda) x\| \le \left(1 \min\left\{1, \frac{\lambda}{\|x\|}\right\}\right) \|x\|$
- $\checkmark$  If the vector x is good enough, the right choice of the clipping level will not spoil the magnitude of the vector
- ✓ Clipping preserves the direction

## 5. New Method: Byz-VR-MARINA-PP

#### Algorithm Byz-VR-MARINA-PP

- : **Input:** starting point  $x^0$ , stepsize  $\gamma$ , minibatch size b, probability  $p \in (0,1]$ , number of iterations K,  $(\delta,c)$ -ARAgg, clients' sample size  $1 \leq C \leq n$ , clipping coefficients  $\{\alpha_k\}_{k>1}$ , direction  $g^0$
- : for  $k = 0, 1, \dots, K 1$  do
- Get a sample from Bernoulli distribution:  $c_k \sim \text{Be}(p)$
- Sample the set of clients  $S_k \subseteq [n]$ ,  $|S_k| = C$  if  $c_k = 0$ ; otherwise  $S_k = [n]$
- 5: Broadcast  $g^k$ ,  $c_k$  to all workers
- 6: **for**  $i \in \mathcal{G} \cap S_k$  in parallel **do**
- 7:  $x^{k+1}=x^k-\gamma g^k$  and  $\lambda_{k+1}=lpha_{k+1}\|x^{k+1}-x^k\|$
- where  $\widehat{\Delta}_i(x^{k+1},x^k)$  is a minibatched estimator of  $abla f_i(x^{k+1})$  —

 $\nabla f_i(x^k)$ ,  $\mathcal{Q}(\cdot)$  for  $i \in \mathcal{G} \cap S_k$  are computed independently

- end for
- 10: **if**  $c_k = 1$  **then**
- 11:  $g^{k+1} = \mathtt{ARAgg}\left(\{g_i^{k+1}\}_{i \in [n]}
  ight)$
- 12: **else**
- 13:  $g^{k+1} = g^k + \mathtt{ARAgg}\left(\left\{\operatorname{clip}_{\lambda_{k+1}}\left(\mathcal{Q}\left(\widehat{\Delta}_i(x^{k+1}, x^k)\right)\right)\right\}_{i \in S_k}\right)$
- 14: end if
- 15: end for
- When  $\alpha_k \equiv +\infty$  Byz-VR-MARINA-PP reduces to Byz-VR-MARINA
- Q is a compression operator
- Clipping level is proportional to  $||x^{k+1}-x^k||$ , which is the key to controlling the bias

#### 6. Technical Preliminaries

#### Definition 2: Unbiased Compression

Operator  $\mathcal{Q}: \mathbb{R}^d \to \mathbb{R}^d$  is called unbiased compressor/compression operator if there exists  $\omega \geq 0$  such that for any  $x \in \mathbb{R}^d$ 

$$\mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{Q}(x)\right] = x, \quad \mathbb{E}\left[\|\mathcal{Q}(x) - x\|^2\right] \le \omega \|x\|^2. \tag{3}$$

- Bounded aggregator:  $\mathsf{ARAgg}(x_1,\ldots,x_n) \leq F \max_{i \in [n]} \|x_i\|$
- Smoothness and lower-boundedness:  $\forall x,y \in \mathbb{R}^d$  we have  $\|\nabla f(x) - \nabla f(y)\| \le L\|x - y\|, \|\nabla f_i(x) - \nabla f_i(y)\| \le L_i\|x - y\|$ for  $i \in \mathcal{G}$  and  $f_* = \inf_{x \in \mathbb{R}^d} f(x) > -\infty$
- $\zeta^2$ -heterogeneity:  $\frac{1}{G} \sum_{i \in \mathcal{G}} \|\nabla f_i(x) \nabla f(x)\|^2 \leq \zeta^2 \quad \forall x \in \mathbb{R}^d$
- Global Hessian variance assumption:
- $\frac{1}{G} \sum \|\nabla f_i(x) \nabla f_i(y)\|^2 \|\nabla f(x) \nabla f(y)\|^2 \le L_{\pm}^2 \|x y\|^2$
- Local Hessian variance assumption:
- $\frac{1}{G} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \mathbb{E} \|\widehat{\Delta}_{i}(x,y) \Delta_{i}(x,y)\|^{2} \leq \frac{\mathcal{L}_{\pm}^{2}}{b} \|x y\|^{2}$ , where  $\Delta_{i}(x,y) = 0$

 $\nabla f_i(x) - \nabla f_i(y)$  and  $\widehat{\Delta}_i(x,y)$  is an unbiased mini-batched estimator of  $\Delta_i(x,y)$  with batch size b

#### 7. Convergence Results

Let the introduced assumptions hold and  $\lambda_{k+1} = 2 \max_{i \in \mathcal{G}} L_i ||x^{k+1} - x^k||$ . Assume that  $0 < \gamma \leq \frac{1}{1+\sqrt{A}}$ , where

$$A = \frac{4}{p} \left( \frac{80 p_{G} \mathcal{P}_{\mathcal{G}_{C}^{k}} (1 - \delta) n}{C^{2} (1 - \delta_{\max})^{2}} \omega + \frac{4}{p} (1 - p_{G}) + \frac{160}{p} p_{G} \mathcal{P}_{\mathcal{G}_{C}^{k}} c \delta_{\max} \omega \right) L^{2} + \frac{64}{p^{2}} (1 - p_{G}) F_{\mathcal{A}}^{2} \max_{i \in \mathcal{G}} L_{i}^{2}$$

$$+ \frac{4}{p} \left( \frac{8 p_{G} \mathcal{P}_{\mathcal{G}_{C}^{k}} (1 - \delta) n}{C^{2} (1 - \delta_{\max})^{2}} (10\omega + 1) + \frac{16}{p} p_{G} \mathcal{P}_{\mathcal{G}_{C}^{k}} c \delta_{\max} (10\omega + 1) \right) L_{\pm}^{2}$$

$$+ \frac{4}{p} \left( \frac{80 p_{G} \mathcal{P}_{\mathcal{G}_{C}^{k}} (1 - \delta) n}{p C^{2} (1 - \delta_{\max})^{2}} (\omega + 1) + \frac{160}{p} p_{G} \mathcal{P}_{\mathcal{G}_{C}^{k}} c \delta_{\max} (\omega + 1) \right) \frac{\mathcal{L}_{\pm}^{2}}{b},$$

where  $p_G := \mathbb{P}\left\{G_C^k \ge (1 - \delta_{\max})C\right\}$  and  $\mathcal{P}_{\mathcal{G}_C^k} := \mathbb{P}\left\{i \in \mathcal{G}_C^k \mid G_C^k \ge (1 - \delta_{\max}) C\right\}.$  Then for all  $K \ge 0$  the point  $\widehat{x}^K$  chosen uniformly at random from the iterates  $x^0, x^1, \ldots, x^K$ produced by Byz-VR-MARINA-PP satisfies

$$\mathbb{E}\left[\|\nabla f(\widehat{x}^K)\|^2\right] \le \frac{2\Phi_0}{\gamma(K+1)} + \frac{48c\delta\zeta^2}{p},\tag{4}$$

where  $\Phi_0 = f(x^0) - f_* + \frac{\gamma}{n} ||g^0 - \nabla f(x^0)||^2$  and  $\mathbb{E}[\cdot]$  denotes the full expectation.


with rate  $\mathcal{O}(1/K)$ • If C=1, then  $p_G=\frac{G}{n}$  and  $\mathcal{P}_{\mathcal{G}_C^k}=\frac{1}{G}$ ; if C=2, then  $p_G=\frac{G(G-1)}{n(n-1)}$  and  $\mathcal{P}_{\mathcal{G}_C^k}=\frac{2}{G}$ ; finally, if C=n, then  $p_G=1$  and  $\mathcal{P}_{\mathcal{G}_{C}^{k}}=1$ 

• When  $\zeta = 0$  (homogeneous data) the method converges asymptotically to the exact solution

• Recommended value of  $p = \min\{C/n, b/m, 1/(1+\omega)\}$ 


# 8. Experiments

- We consider a logistic regression model with  $\ell_2$ -regularization
- 15 good workers and 5 Byzantines; access to the entire dataset
- Aggregation: coordinate-wise median with bucketing
- Shift-back attack: if Byzantines form a majority during round k, then each Byzantine sends  $x^0 - x^k$ ; otherwise, they follow protocol



Left: Linear convergence of Byz-VR-MARINA-PP with clipping versus non-convergence without clipping. Middle: Full versus partial participation. Right: Clipping multiplier  $\alpha$  sensitivity.

- We consider a ResNet-18 model architecture with layer norm
- We consider the CIFAR 10 dataset with heterogeneous splits with 20 clients, 5 of which are Byzantines, and 4 clients are sampled in each step
- Attacks: we consider A Little is Enough (ALIE), Bit Flipping (BF), and Shift-Back (SHB) attacks
- Aggregation: we consider coordinate median (CM) and robust federated averaging (RFA) with bucketing



Training loss (top) and test accuracy (bottom) of 2 aggregation rules (CM, RFA) under 4 attacks (BF, LF, ALIE, SHB) on the CIFAR10 dataset under heterogeneous data split with 20 clients, 5 of which are malicious, 4 clients sampled per round.

#### References

gradient descent. NeurIPS 2017

- [1] Sai Praneeth Karimireddy, Lie He, and Martin Jaggi. Byzantine-robust learning on heterogeneous datasets via bucketing. ICLR 2022. [2] Aaron Defazio, Francis Bach, and Simon Lacoste-Julien. SAGA: A fast incremental gradient method with support for non-strongly convex composite objectives. NeurIPS 2014.
- stochastic recursive gradient. ICML 2017 [4] Samuel Horváth, Lihua Lei, Peter Richtárik, and Michael I. Jordan. Adaptivity of stochastic gradient methods for nonconvex optimization. SIAM Journal on Mathematics of Data Science, 2022.

[3] Lam M Nguyen, Jie Liu, Katya Scheinberg, and Martin Takáč. SARAH: A novel method for machine learning problems using

- [5] Zhize Li, Hongyan Bao, Xiangliang Zhang, and Peter Richtárik. PAGE: A simple and optimal probabilistic gradient estimator for nonconvex optimization. ICML 2021.
- [6] Eduard Gorbunov, Konstantin P Burlachenko, Zhize Li, and Peter Richtárik. MARINA: Faster non-convex distributed learning with compression. ICML 2021. [7] Peva Blanchard, El Mahdi El Mhamdi, Rachid Guerraoui, and Julien Stainer. Machine learning with adversaries: Byzantine tolerant
- [8] Gilad Baruch, Moran Baruch, and Yoav Goldberg. A little is enough: Circumventing defenses for distributed learning. NeurIPS 2019. [9] Cong Xie, Oluwasanmi Koyejo, and Indranil Gupta. Fall of empires: Breaking Byzantine-tolerant SGD by inner product manipulation.